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Full Faith and Republican Guarantees: Gay Marriage, 
FMPA, and the Courts 
 
John C. Eastman*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“What difference does it make to your heterosexual marriage if I 
enter into a homosexual marriage?” Such is the frequent rejoinder to 
claims that traditional marriage needs to be protected by state or federal 
law or even by a federal constitutional amendment. The rejoinder point is 
admirably well made by Professor Robert Riggs in The Supreme Court 
and Same-Sex Marriage: A Prediction, also published in this symposium 
issue.1 Professor Nick Bala elaborated on the same point and contends 
that, at symposium in which these papers were delivered, no one offered 
any argument rebutting that proposition. 
I have a different point of view. Marriage may be an individual bond, 
but it is fostered by society because it also fulfills fundamental societal 
functions.  Indeed, it is my contention that Professor Bala himself offered 
ample arguments in support of this proposition.  He said, for example, 
that there is a substantial difference between marriage and domestic 
partnerships both from the individual’s point of view and that of society 
as a whole. He said that there is a profound symbolic significance to 
extending marriage to same-sex couples. He asserted that such a move 
would provide an important social validation to same-sex marriage, and 
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage 
perpetuates the view that same-sex relationships are less worthy of 
recognition—one might instead say less important to society in 
furthering the societal goals advanced by marriage as it has traditionally 
been understood.2
 *Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, and Director, The Claremont 
Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence. This article is based on remarks delivered at a 
symposium on the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment held at the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School, Brigham Young University, in September 2005, and previously at a symposium on the 
Federal Defense of Marriage Act held at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of 
America, in May 2004. 
 1. See Robert E. Riggs, The Supreme Court and Same-Sex Marriage: A Prediction, 20 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 345 (2006) (published in this issue). 
 2. Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and the United States: 
Controversy Over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social Institution, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 195 (2006) 
(published in this issue). 
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Professor Bala then told the history—the non-static history—of 
marriage. In his depiction of marriage history we find an unbelievably 
important example for us: no-fault divorce. The United States did not 
embrace no-fault divorce until 1969, and as Professor Bala pointed out, 
the move to no-fault divorce has fundamentally changed the nature of 
marriage in the short time since it was made.3
There were a significant number of people who, at the time it was 
proposed, argued against no-fault divorce because it would change the 
nature of marriage. No-fault divorce, it was argued, would undermine the 
institution of marriage and the understanding of family, which has been 
an important foundation for civilized society. Feminist theorists, in 
particular, expressed concern about the economic consequences of no-
fault divorce to women and their custodial children.4 The response then 
was much the same as it is now—it was what Justice Scalia described in 
the related context of nude dancing as the “Thoreauvian ‘you-may-do-
what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else’ beau ideal”:5 
How did the availability of no-fault divorce that might be utilized by 
others hurt your marriage? Professor Bala answered that for us during his 
presentation: the move to no-fault divorce fundamentally changed the 
nature of marriage.6
The consequences of that change have been profound, even if not 
perfectly understood. As one particularly insightful citizen noted during 
recent debate over California’s Proposition 227: 
Why do we have the institution of marriage anyway? 
I believe that a society is only as strong as its permanent, 
heterosexual, monogamous marriages. Consider the changes in America 
in the last 40 years [since the move to no-fault divorce]. We changed 
from having one of the lowest prison populations to having one of the 
highest incarceration rates in the world, and 80 percent of the inmates 
come from families with broken marriages or no marriages. 
The teen suicide rate has more than tripled from 1960 to today. 
During this same period, the divorce rate tripled and the number of 
children living in homes with broken marriages increased from 8 percent 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); Martha 
Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, A Study in Rhetoric 
and Response in Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 789, both cited in 
Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 
FAM. L. Q. 783, 783 (1999). 
 5. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 6. Nicholas Bala, supra note 2, at 200-201. 
 7. California’s Proposition 22 proposed that only marriage between a man and a woman be 
valid or recognized in California. 
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to 24 percent. 
The academic achievement of American students falls way behind 
students from around the world. It is not all the schools’ fault. More than 
half of the students in our schools are living in broken homes. We can 
have the best schools in the world, but if a child is not loved, cared for 
and protected at home, he will almost never succeed in school. 
I am coming to believe that the most important factor in achieving a 
successful, safe and prosperous society is the strength of our marriages. 
Children are delicate and tender and need, most of all, to have a father 
and a mother who love each other and are committed to providing them a 
safe, nurturing, permanent home to grow up in.8
The consequences of the latest push to disconnect marriage from 
either its procreative or parenting functions will, I predict, be equally 
profound, even if the full extent of those consequences cannot be 
predicted with any degree of scientific certainty. 
 
II.  THE SHIFTING FOUNDATION FOR MARRIAGE 
 
The Supreme Court’s 1885 decision in Murphy v. Ramsey9 is a good 
place to start for a description of the earlier understandings of marriage. 
Murphy was a voting rights case from the Utah Territory. Jesse Murphy 
and other polygamists challenged the federal law requiring that a 
prospective voter certify, under oath and as a precondition to voting 
eligibility, that he was not a bigamist or polygamist. The Court upheld 
the voting restriction, noting the importance of monogamous, 
heterosexual marriage in the strongest of terms: 
 
For, certainly, no legislation can be supposed more wholesome 
and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing 
commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to establish it on the 
basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing 
from the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy 
estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and 
noble in our civilization; the best guarantee of that reverent 
morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social 
and political improvement.10
 
There is much wisdom in the Supreme Court’s early view, not the 
least of which its focus on societal benefit rather than self-autonomy. 
 8. Bert J. Rapp, Letters: Support Marriage, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (California), Feb. 15, 
2000, at B07. 
 9. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). 
 10. Id. at 45. 
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Marriage may be an individual bond, but it is fostered by society because 
it also fulfills important—indeed, fundamental—societal functions. As a 
result, questions about the nature and scope of marriage cannot be 
viewed simply as matters of individual rights, and those who do take this 
view misunderstand the institution of marriage as well as society’s 
historical role in fostering that institution and in benefiting from it. 
The view of today’s courts is radically different. The entire focus has 
shifted to the individual rights rather than the social institution view of 
marriage, undoubtedly the result of a decades-long series of court 
decisions depicting various rights to privacy and autonomy.11 The most 
recent of these “rights revolution” cases, Lawrence v. Texas, cleared the 
way for an extension of marriage beyond the monogamous, heterosexual 
relationship grounded in the nature of male and female, that has 
historically defined the institution. Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-
justice majority in Lawrence, held that the Texas anti-sodomy law did 
not survive rational basis review—the most lenient level of judicial 
scrutiny—when confronted with the claim that a prohibition on sodomy 
infringed constitutionally-protected liberty interests.12 Under traditional 
rational basis review, the constitutionality of the law is presumed, and 
courts are required to uphold the law unless the person challenging the 
law can demonstrate that there is no legitimate governmental purpose 
furthered by the law.13 A legislature does not have to be correct in its 
assessment that the law will further a legitimate governmental purpose as 
long as it could reasonably believe that a legitimate purpose would be 
advanced. 
The question confronted by the Court in Lawrence was whether the 
fostering of long-standing views about the immorality of certain sexual 
conduct was a legitimate governmental interest. The traditional definition 
of the state’s police power is the power of government to protect the 
health, safety, welfare, and morals of the people.14 Sodomy has been 
considered immoral for thousands of years by nearly every civilization 
on earth.15 As Justice Scalia noted in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., “Our 
society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain 
 11. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 12. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 13. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Federal Communications Commission v. 
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993). 
 14. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). 
 15. See, e.g., Plato’s Laws, Book VIII 835d-842a; Genesis 19:5-8, 24-26; Deuteronomy 
23:17; Leviticus 18:16-20, 22-23; 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533) (making “buggery committed with mankind 
or beast” a capital offense); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215. See Survey on the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 
525 (1986), from which these citations are drawn. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-
94 (1986). 
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activities not because they harm others but because they are considered, 
in the traditional phrase, ‘contra bonos mores,’ i.e., immoral. In 
American society, such prohibitions have included, for example, 
sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, 
and sodomy.”16 From that statement and the fact that prohibitions on 
sodomy had been upheld by the Supreme Court as recently as 1986, it is 
evident that the Texas legislature could have reasonably believed that its 
prohibition on homosexual sodomy furthered the legitimate 
governmental interest of protecting the health, safety, welfare, and 
morals of the people and therefore, would be upheld as constitutional. 
In other words, the Texas statute should have easily survived rational 
basis review. That it did not has led many commentators, and not a few 
courts, to infer that Justice Kennedy was actually assessing the Texas 
statute under a much stricter standard, perhaps even approaching strict 
scrutiny.17 For Court tea-leaf readers, other evidence exists that a 
standard approaching strict scrutiny is afoot. The opinion in Lawrence 
was released June 26, 2003, the last court day of the term. Among the 
end-of-term orders released the next morning was a GVR18 in Limon v. 
Kansas,19 a case involving a male-on-male statutory rape conviction that 
occurred in a Kansas juvenile facility for the developmentally disabled. 
Although Justice Kennedy specifically noted in Lawrence that the 
holding of irrationality was limited to actions by consenting adults in the 
privacy of their own homes, Limon was remanded for further 
consideration in light of Lawrence despite the fact that it did not involve 
adults, or consent, or the privacy of one’s home. This odd GVR thus 
indicates that none of the three limitations purportedly so critical to the 
Lawrence holding were actually material, suggesting that some sort of 
new-found fundamental right or suspect classification was instead 
motivating the decision. 
It did not take long for the implicit rationale of Lawrence to spread to 
the same-sex marriage arena. Indeed, Justice Margaret Marshall’s 
 16. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991). 
 17. See, e.g. Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004); United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 352 
F.Supp.2d 578, 592 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (citing Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence to 
support application of strict scrutiny to obscenity statute); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (acknowledging argument that Lawrence requires 
strict scrutiny for any state action dealing with procreation, sexuality, and family); see also People v. 
Downin, 357 Ill.App.3d 193, 199 (2005) (rejecting contention that the “inescapable” conclusion to 
be drawn from Lawrence is that engaging in homosexual conduct is a fundamental right subject to 
strict scrutiny); Williams v. Attorney General of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1251-53 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (contending that Lawrence actually recognized a fundamental, due process 
right to private sexual conduct, which is therefore subject to strict scrutiny). 
 18. GVR is an abbreviation for: grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment 
below, and remand. 
 19. Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003). 
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opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health20 took a page directly from Justice 
Kennedy’s playbook. Although Justice Marshall claimed to have applied 
rational basis review in striking down Massachusetts’ centuries-old 
marriage law, that law should easily have passed constitutional muster 
under the highly deferential standard of rational basis review. It is 
perplexing, for example, how Justice Marshall could contend that there 
was no rational basis for distinguishing between heterosexual and 
homosexual couples in eligibility for marriage, even with respect to 
procreation and the rearing of children!21
At least six other state and federal courts within the last ten years 
have ruled there is a rational relation between the states’ definition of 
marriage and procreation.22 In Lewis v. Harris, for example, the New 
Jersey Court of Appeals noted “that the historical and prevailing 
contemporary conception of marriage as solely a union between a single 
man and a single woman is based partly on society’s view that this 
institution plays an essential role in propagating the species and child 
rearing.”23 The Indiana Court of Appeals held, in Morrison v. Sandler, 
that “The State, first of all, may legitimately create the institution of 
opposite-sex marriage, and all the benefits accruing to it, in order to 
encourage male-female couples to procreate within the legitimacy and 
stability of a state-sanctioned relationship and to discourage unplanned, 
out-of-wedlock births resulting from ‘casual’ intercourse.”24 Justice 
Marshall’s argument to the contrary—that not all heterosexual couples 
bear or raise children, and that some same-sex couples, through artificial 
 20. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 21. Id. at 964.  Professor Riggs conceded this point during discussion at the symposium, 
stating: “The Goodridge decision is very badly reasoned and should have been based on strict 
scrutiny.” 
 22. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1309 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ([T]his court . . . is bound by 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that encouraging the raising of children in homes consisting of a 
married mother and father is a legitimate state interest. . . . DOMA is rationally related to this 
interest”) (internal citations omitted); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) 
(“Authority exits [sic] that the promotion of marriage to encourage the maintenance of stable 
relationships that facilitate to the maximum extent possible the rearing of children by both of their 
biological parents is a legitimate congressional concern”); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 
451, 463-64 (Ariz. App. Div. 1, 2003) (review denied 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 62, May 25, 2004) (“We 
hold that the State has a legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child-rearing within the 
marital relationship, and that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is rationally related to that 
interest.”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (“[I]t appears that the Supreme 
Court has seen marriage as having a traditional principal purpose: to regulate and legitimize the 
procreation of children. . . . I believe that this central purpose of the marriage statute – this emphasis 
on child-bearing – provides the kind of rational basis defined in Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642-43, 
permitting limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples.”); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 
(Ind. App. 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. App. 2005). 
 23. Lewis, 875 A.2d at 269 n.2. 
 24. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24. 
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means or adoption, do bear and/or raise children—is one grounded in 
strict scrutiny’s requirement of narrow tailoring, not in rational basis 
review’s tolerance of imperfect fits. Reasonable people might disagree 
about whether sexual orientation should be deemed a suspect 
classification entitled to heightened scrutiny, or whether perpetuating 
marriage as a monogamous heterosexual union constitutes good policy, 
but it is simply dishonest to contend that such a policy judgment by the 
people of Massachusetts does not pass rational basis review. 
Moreover, even if Justice Marshall was correct in her assertion that 
procreation and child-rearing do not provide a rational basis for 
traditional marriage, there are other rationales, easily discerned, that 
should have required the court’s affirmation of the long-standing 
Massachusetts marriage law. Two businessmen in Massachusetts,25 
troubled by the Goodridge decision, sketched out in graphic form a 
perfectly sensible and legitimate governmental purpose that is furthered 
by the historical definition of marriage. Before Goodridge, the family 
structure encouraged by the Massachusetts marriage law looked 
something like this: 
 
              
In order to strengthen this family relationship, the Massachusetts 
marriage laws restrict inter-family marriage. Chapter 207, Section 1, of 
the Massachusetts statutory code provides that “No man shall marry his 
mother, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, sister, stepmother, 
grandfather’s wife, grandson’s wife, wife’s mother, wife’s grandmother, 
wife’s daughter, wife’s granddaughter, brother’s daughter, sister’s 
daughter, father’s sister or mother’s sister.” Similarly, Section 2 provides 
that “No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson, 
brother, stepfather, grandmother’s husband, daughter’s husband, 
 25. Bill Habeeb and Brian Carney at the Wynn Interactive Company in Boston. The graphic 
depictions which follow are reprinted here with their permission. 
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granddaughter’s husband, husband’s grandfather, husband’s son, 
husband’s grandson, brother’s son, sister’s son, father’s brother or 
mother’s brother.” The interplay of these laws and the historical 
understanding of marriage produces the following matrix of permissible 
relationships: 
 
 
 
On its face, Goodridge worked a very small change in this graphical 
depiction: 
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And on the larger matrix, the change at first blush likewise seems 
relatively minor: 
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This all seems simple enough. Why should such a minor change 
affect those who choose not to embrace it? What legitimate 
governmental purpose could possibly be furthered by blocking such a 
simple thing as this? Let us consider this minor change in light of the 
other existing provisions of the Massachusetts marriage laws. The 
statutory prohibitions on incest, for example, apply by their terms only to 
members of the opposite sex. So unless there is some further 
development in the law either by the legislature or the Supreme Judicial 
Court, all of these interactions within the family are now permissible: 
 
 
 
Of course, once we realize that it is permissible for a brother to marry his 
brother, we will have to consider whether there is any possible rationale 
for continuing to bar him from marrying his sister, and even the existing 
prohibitions in Massachusetts would fall. The once well-ordered notion 
of family would give way to this chaotic set of possible combinations: 
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Surely preventing the slippery slope that would make possible such 
chaos is a legitimate governmental purpose. 
Of course, the courts might instead re-write the Massachusetts incest 
statutes to ban same-sex intra-family marital relationships as well,26 and 
we could write this example off as a silly hypothetical of the sort 
typically served up by law professors in the classroom. But once we have 
established that the ability to marry whomever one wants is a 
fundamental, constitutionally-protected liberty interest—which, in truth, 
is what the Goodridge decision does—would such a ban be permissible? 
What principled understanding of liberty requires the recognition of 
same-sex marriage but still permits restrictions on inter-family marriage 
by consenting adults, once we have divorced marriage from its societal 
purpose and made it rather a matter of individual right? 
 
III.  THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF GOODRIDGE AND LAWRENCE 
 
The damage from Goodridge and Lawrence is more far-reaching 
even than this, however. As I said, by pretending that there is no rational 
basis for the long-standing Massachusetts marriage laws or the long-
standing Texas prohibition against sodomy, the Goodridge and Lawrence 
courts actually applied some unspoken form of strict scrutiny. Once that 
proposition is firmly entrenched, a number of other existing restrictions 
on whom one can marry, or how many one can marry, would likely fall 
as well. Justice Scalia predicted this in his dissenting opinion in 
Lawrence: 
 
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, 
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and 
obscenity are . . . sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws 
based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into 
question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the 
scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.27
 
Already there are groups seeking to make good on Justice Scalia’s 
prediction by pressing the outer limits of the Goodridge and Lawrence 
holdings. In April 2004, for example, a feature article appeared in the 
 26. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 n.34 (Mass. 2003) 
(“Nothing in our opinion today should be construed as relaxing or abrogating the consanguinity or 
polygamy prohibitions of our marriage laws. . . . Rather, the statutory provisions concerning 
consanguinity or polygamous marriages shall be construed in a gender neutral manner”). 
 27. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); See also Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, 122 P.3d 781, 793 
(Alaska 2005) (noting, but rejecting on fairly specious grounds, government’s argument that 
rationale requiring recognition of same-sex marriage would equally require recognition of 
polygamous marriage). 
  
254 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 20 
 
San Francisco Chronicle sympathetically portraying “polyamorists”—
those who have intimate attachments to multiple partners—and their 
efforts to force recognition of their multi-faceted “marriages.” As one 
woman quoted in the article noted, “I wear a wedding ring for my 
husband and a bracelet for Conley,” the third person in the relationship. 
The article also described a four-way relationship, noting that although 
“Ann Spurry and her husband Terrance Rolf did not involve Peter and 
Conley in their Alameda marriage ceremony, other polyamorist 
Unitarians have proposed church ceremonies to bless threesomes, 
foursomes and moresomes.”28 Similarly, new challenges to longstanding 
restrictions on polygamy have recently been brought, and although such 
challenges have thus far been unsuccessful, the courts appear to 
recognize that the Lawrence holding will “likely” call into question 
existing precedent upholding prohibitions on bigamy. As one New Jersey 
court recently recognized: 
 
The same form of constitutional attack that plaintiffs mount against 
statutes limiting the institution of marriage to members of the opposite 
sex also could be made against statutes prohibiting polygamy. Persons 
who desire to enter into polygamous marriages undoubtedly view such 
marriages, just as plaintiffs view same-sex marriages, as “compelling 
and definitive expression[s] of love and commitment” among the 
parties to the union.29
 
Will the state not be equally obligated to recognize these “marriages” 
too, once a liberty-interest-in-personal-fulfillment model of marriage 
supplants the societal-benefit model heretofore recognized and fostered? 
Recently an e-mail circulated across the internet making some 
humorous predictions of what a state-sponsored marriage license system 
would look like once the shift to an individual-fulfillment model of 
marriage had been accomplished. It read something like this: 
 
• Marriage licenses should be like fishing licenses. 
• You want resident or visitor? Salt water, fresh, or both? Just for 
the weekend, 30-days, all year? Lifetime? Wow; brave soul! 
 28. Don Lattin, Bay Area Committed to Marriage for the Masses: Polyamorists Say They 
Relate Honestly to Multiple Partners, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 20, 2004 at B1. 
 29. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 270 (N.J. Super., App. Div. 2005); see also Goodridge, 
798 N.E.2d at 984 n.2 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“The same semantic sleight of hand [applied by the 
majority] could transform every other restriction on marriage into a right of fundamental importance. 
For example, if one assumes that a group of mature, consenting, committed adults can form a 
‘marriage,’ the prohibition on polygamy . . . infringes on their ‘right’ to ‘marry’”). 
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• Cotton to your brother or sister? Try the salmon stamp. 
Endangered species. 
• Hey you, Oedipus! Try the Matriarch Special? Only fourteen 
dollars extra! 
• Same-sex? You’ve got a choice of a pink or a blue stamp. 
• Plural marriage? Now you’re really talkin’! How many stamps 
you want? 
• These are good only in California, of course. No Full Faith and 
Credit or Supremacy problems here. 
• You want the Traditional Nationwide-Worldwide Special? We 
have a deal on that, this week only. 
• Proceeds from all stamps go to the Marriage Rights Litigation 
Fund. 
• Wear your license on the front of your jacket or hat where it can 
be seen by the Warden at all times, and remember, anything too 
young has to be thrown back! 
A more serious version of the same proposition was recently published 
by the San Francisco Chronicle. In a Sunday opinion piece, Professor 
Colin Jones argued for a “free-market” approach to marriage, in which “a 
plethora of choices would become available to prospective 
newlyweds.”30 He elaborated on just what he had in mind: 
 
A Catholic marital corporation would forbid its members from 
divorcing. Progressive marital corporations would allow gay marriage. 
Islamic or Mormon fundamentalist marital corporations could allow 
polygamy. Plain vanilla marital corporations would probably be 
popular among people who just want to get married without thinking 
about it too much. . . . [M]inors below a certain age would be excluded 
from joining a marital corporation.31
At least Professor Jones was honest enough to admit candidly that 
“allowing same-sex unions (either through a marital corporation regime 
or the ad hoc approach some states are already following) will eliminate 
the presumption of reproduction that underlies traditional marriage,” and 
 30. Colin P.A. Jones, Marriage Proposal: Why Not Privatize? Partnerships Could Be 
Tailored to Fit, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2006 at D1. 
 31. Id. 
  
256 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 20 
 
that “[i]f the presumption of reproduction is no longer needed, then there 
is no real reason to prevent incestuous marriages.”32
Yet even more absurd consequences will be possible once the shift 
from the societal-institution model to the personal-fulfillment model as 
the foundation for marriage is accomplished. In the wake of the 
Goodridge decision, several Massachusetts legislators introduced “An 
Act Relative to Archaic Crimes”33 that would repeal the long-standing 
statute forbidding the “abominable and detestable crime against nature, 
either with mankind or with a beast.”34 Although a new law would 
continue to forbid “a sexual act on an animal”—apparently the reference 
to crimes against nature is passé—the punishment was reduced from a 
maximum 20-year term in state prison by permitting an alternate 
punishment of a mere two and a half-year maximum term in the county 
jail or a $5,000 fine,35 and one has to wonder how even the reduced 
punishment can be imposed for such an intrusion on one’s liberty. 
Although the Massachusetts law has not been adopted, a similar 
story has already played out in the Netherlands. In March 2004, Reuters 
reported a story about a Dutch prosecutor who declined to prosecute a 
man engaged in bestiality because there was no explicit law against 
bestiality on the books. Legislators who quickly moved to remedy that 
oversight struggled to find an appropriate ground on which to sustain 
such a law. The patent immorality of the conduct was no longer 
sufficient in a world awash in the fundamental right to self-fulfillment, so 
the legislature instead had to rest its new prohibition on the claim that 
such conduct would infringe the animal’s right to physical integrity 
without its consent, a consent that it is not possible for an animal to give. 
How that rationale could be squared with the fact that animals’ physical 
integrity is routinely and thoroughly violated without their consent when 
they are slaughtered for food, the legislature did not say. Nor did the 
legislature explain why an animal’s right to physical integrity should 
outweigh a human being’s right to self-fulfillment—perhaps that will be 
the subject of the next round of litigation. 
A similar scenario played out in Utah a few years ago.  A man 
entered the cage of a crane at the Tracy Aviary in Salt Lake City and 
proceeded to rape the bird, which subsequently died as a result.  The 
state sought to press charges, but the legislature had omitted the crime of 
bestiality when it rewrote the criminal code a few years earlier, 
apparently it the mistaken belief that the prohibition was anachronistic.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Senate Bill No. 938, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/senate/st00/ 
st00938.htm. 
 34. Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 272, § 34. 
 35. Senate Bill No. 938, supra, n. 33. 
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Instead, the man was charged with a simple destruction of property (for 
the death of the $1200 bird).  The legislature reinstated the bestiality 
statute the next legislative session.36
These are, of course, slippery slope arguments, and like all slippery 
slope arguments, they tend to focus on absurd examples to prove a point. 
The point here is not that these consequences will necessarily follow, or 
even that homosexual sexual relations are comparable to polygamous or 
inter-specie sexual relations. The point, rather, is that there is no 
principled way to distinguish these things once self-fulfillment becomes 
the sina qua non of the institution of marriage. 
Maybe all of this makes sense as a matter of policy, but the latest 
spate of litigation has not proceeded as though this were simply a dispute 
about policy. Instead, the individual rights model that underlay the latest 
litigation has encouraged courts to make fundamental policy decisions 
that heretofore have been made by legislatures. In the process, they have 
discarded the policy purposes served by the traditional model of 
marriage, probably at great peril. 
 
IV.  SOCIETY’S INTEREST IN TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE 
 
What are the legitimate policies served by the traditional model, and 
why should we be concerned than unelected, unaccountable judges have 
so cavalierly discarded such long-standing policy? Recent litigation in 
California challenging the state’s prohibition on same-sex marriage has 
brought several to the forefront.37 In 1859, shortly after California 
 36. Salt Lake Tribune, May 2, 2000, B2. 
 37. The discussion which follows is drawn from an amicus curiae brief I filed in my capacity 
as Director of the Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in the consolidated 
Marriage Cases (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., Div. 3, Coordination Proceeding No. 4365) on behalf 
of James Q. Wilson, Emeritus Professor, University of California, Los Angeles; Hadley Arkes, 
Edward N. Ney Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions, Amherst College; Steven G. 
Calabresi, George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University School of Law; 
Lloyd Cohen, Professor of Law at George Mason University School of Law; Edward J. Erler, 
Department of Political Science, California State University, San Bernardino; Robert P. George, 
McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University; Leon Kass, University of Chicago; 
Charles Kesler, Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College; Douglas W. Kmiec, Chair 
and Professor of Constitutional Law, Pepperdine University; Daniel H. Lowenstein, Professor, 
University of California, Los Angeles; David Popenoe, Professor of Sociology, Rutgers University; 
Stephen B. Presser, Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of 
Law; Katherine Shaw Spaht, Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, Louisiana State 
University Law Center; and Thomas G. West, Professor of Politics, University of Dallas, an 
interdisciplinary group of legal and family scholars with a professional and scholarly interest in the 
role of marriage in law and society. The principal author of the brief was co-counsel Joshua K. 
Baker, Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, who drew on arguments previously published by 
Maggie Gallagher, President of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy, in (How) Will Gay 
Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 UNIV. ST. 
THOMAS L. J. 33 (Fall 2004). 
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became a state, the California Supreme Court held in Baker v. Baker that, 
“the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is 
procreation.”38 The opinion was written by Justice Stephen Field, who 
later became a highly-regarded Associate Justice on the Supreme Court 
of the United States. In Sharon v. Sharon, the California Court cited a 
treatise stating that “the procreation of children under the shield and 
sanction of the law” is one of the “two principal ends of marriage.”39 
More recently, the California Court of Appeals has reiterated Justice 
Field’s view that the “first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature 
and society, is procreation.”40 And in Maslow v. Maslow, the Second 
Appellate District explicitly connected the procreation aspect of marriage 
to societal interest: “Ordinary marriage relations between husband and 
wife are the foundation on which the perpetuation of society and 
civilization rests.”41
Nor is California alone in this view. Most states and the United 
States Supreme Court itself have in the past similarly recognized that the 
state’s principal interest in marriage is procreation. In Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, the Supreme Court noted a connection between marriage and 
procreation, observing that “[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental 
to the very existence and survival of the race.”42 The New Jersey courts 
have recognized that “[p]rocreation, if not the sole, is at least an 
important, reason for the existence of the marriage 
relation.”43 The New York courts have adopted a similar 
view: “The great end of matrimony is . . . the procreation of a progeny 
having a legal title to maintenance by the father.”44 The Fifth Circuit in 
Poe v. Gerstein noted that “procreation of offspring could be considered 
one of the major purposes of marriage. . . .”45 In Singer v. Hara, the 
Washington Court of Appeals noted that “marriage exists as a protected 
legal institution primarily because of societal values associated with the 
propagation of the human race.”46 The Minnesota Supreme Court in 
Baker v. Nelson recognized that the “institution of marriage as a union of 
man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of 
 38. Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 103 (1859). 
 39. Sharon v. Sharon, 75 Cal. 1 (1888) (quoting STEWART ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, § 
103). 
 40. Schaub v. Schaub, 71 Cal. App. 2d 467, 478 (App. Ct. 1945); See also Aufort v. Aufort, 9 
Cal. App. 2d 310, 311 (App. Ct. 1935) (“Again, the first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of 
nature and society, is procreation”). 
 41. Maslow v. Maslow, 117 Cal. App.2d 237, 241 (App. Ct. 1953). 
 42. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 43. Davis v. Davis, 106 A. 644, 645 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1919). 
 44. Laudo v. Laudo, 197 N.Y.S. 396, 397 (App. Div. 1919). 
 45. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 46. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974). 
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children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.”47 I could go 
on at length,48 but I will close with this observation from New Jersey: 
“Lord Penzance has observed that the procreation of children is one of 
the ends of marriage. I do not hesitate to say that it is the most important 
object of matrimony, for without it the human race itself would perish 
from the earth.”49
Of course, procreation can, and often does, occur outside of 
marriage. Thus, it must be that the government’s interest in marriage is 
not simply unfettered procreation, but procreation under circumstances 
that the state reasonably believes will provide the optimal conditions for 
raising children—a stable home, headed by a monogamous couple who 
are the children’s natural parents. As far back as 30 A.D., Musonius 
Rufus, a Roman Stoic, recognized that the institution of marriage does 
more than foster mere procreation: 
 
The birth of a human being which results from such a union is to be 
sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the relation of 
husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage it could result 
from any other sexual union, just as in the case of animals.50
In other words, the state’s interest in marriage is in more than just 
procreation, but in paternity as well—the common-sense of which has 
 47. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for want of a 
substantial federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 48. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d 673 F.2d 
1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that a “state has a compelling interest in encouraging and fostering 
procreation of the race”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 337 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (finding that this “central purpose . . . provides the kind of rational 
basis . . . permitting limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples”); Zoglio v. Zoglio, 157 A.2d 
627, 628 (D.C. App. 1960) (“One of the primary purposes of matrimony is procreation”); Lyon v. 
Barney, 132 Ill. App. 45, 50 (App. Ct. 1907) (“[T]he procreating of the human species is regarded, at 
least theoretically, as the primary purpose of marriage . . .”); Gard v. Gard, 169 N.W. 908, 912 
(Mich. 1918) (“It has been said in many of the cases cited that one of the great purposes of marriage 
is procreation”); Frost v. Frost, 181 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958) (discussing 
“one of the primary purposes of marriage, to wit, the procreation of the human species”); Ramon v. 
Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 108 (Fam. Ct. Div. Richmond County 1942) (“The procreation of off-
spring under the natural law being the object of marriage, its permanency is the foundation of the 
social order”); Pretlow v. Pretlow, 14 S.E.2d 381, 385 (Va. 1941) (“The State is interested in 
maintaining the sanctity of marriage relations, and it is interested in the ordered preservation of the 
race. It has a double interest”); Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 N.W. 252, 254 (Mich. 1940) (stating that 
“procreation of children is one of the important ends of matrimony”); Grover v. Zook, 87 P.638, 639 
(Wash. 1906) (“One of the most important functions of wedlock is the procreation of children”); 
Heup v. Heup, 172 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Wis. 1969) (“Having children is a primary purpose of 
marriage”). 
 49. Turney v. Avery, 113 A. 710, 710 (N.J. Ch. 1921) (citations omitted). 
 50. Musonius Rufus, Fragment 13A, What Is the Chief End of Marriage?, translated in 
MUSONIUS RUFUS: THE ROMAN SOCRATES 89 (Cora E. Lutz ed. & trans., 1947). 
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been known at least as long ago as Plato toyed with the idea of a political 
order based on the community of wives and children.51 As Professor 
John Witte recently noted, American jurists addressing the connection 
between marriage and procreation have drawn on a long-standing 
philosophical discourse that understood the word “procreation” to refer 
to more than the mere physical generation of children’s bodies: 
 
Procreation, however, means more than just conceiving children. It also 
means rearing and educating them for spiritual and temporal living—a 
common Stoic sentiment. The good of procreation cannot be achieved 
in this fuller sense simply through the licit union of husband and wife 
in sexual intercourse. It also requires maintenance of a faithful, stable, 
and permanent union of husband and wife for the sake of their 
children.52
The State also has a legitimate, indeed compelling, interest in 
maximizing the likelihood that children are raised by both their mothers 
and their fathers in a low-conflict marriage. Current social scientific data 
suggests that the law of marriage protects children to the extent that it 
increases the likelihood that children will be born to and raised by their 
biological mother and father in a low-conflict union. Child Trends, a 
leading and respected child research organization, summed up the current 
social science consensus on common family structures as follows: 
 
Research clearly demonstrates that family structure matters for 
children, and the family structure that helps the most is a family headed 
by two biological parents in a low-conflict marriage. Children in single-
parent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in 
stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships face higher risks of poor 
outcomes. . . . There is thus value for children in promoting strong, 
stable marriages between biological parents.53
The risks to children when mothers and fathers do not get and stay 
married include: poverty,54 suicide,55 mental illness,56 physical illness,57 
 51. Plato, THE REPUBLIC, Book IV, 423e-424a (Giovanni R. F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith 
trans., Cambridge University Press 2000). 
 52. John Witte, Jr., Propter Honoris Respectum: The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1035 (2001). 
 53. Kristin Anderson Moore, et al., “Marriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does Family 
Structure Affect Children and What Can We Do About It?” Child Trends Research Brief, June 2002, 
at 1. 
 54. I. Sawhill, “Families at Risk,” in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 ELECTION 
AND BEYOND 97-135 (H.J. Aaron and R.D. Reischauer, eds., 1999); Sara McLanahan, Family, State, 
and Child Well-Being, 26 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 703 (2000); Mark R. Rank & Thomas A. Hirschl, The 
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infant mortality,58 lower educational attainment,59 juvenile delinquency 
and conduct disorder,60 adult criminality,61 early unwed parenthood,62 
lower life expectancy,63 and less warm and close relations with both 
Economic Risk of Childhood in America: Estimating the Probability of Poverty Across the 
Formative Years, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1058 (1999). 
 55. Gregory R. Johnson, et al., Suicide Among Adolescents and Young Adults: A Cross-
National Comparison of 34 Countries, 30 SUICIDE LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 74 (2000); David 
Lester, Domestic Integration and Suicide in 21 Nations, 1950-1985, XXXV INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 131 
(1994); David M. Cutler, et al., Explaining the Rise in Youth Suicide, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 7713 (2000). 
 56. E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE 
RECONSIDERED (2002); Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato 
and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis, 15 J. OF FAM. PSYCHOL. 355 (2001); Ronald L. Simons, et al., 
Explaining the Higher Incidence of Adjustment Problems Among Children of Divorce Compared 
with Those in Two-Parent Families, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1020 (1999); Andrew J. Cherlin, et al., 
Effects of Parental Divorce on Mental Health Throughout the Life Course, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 239 
(1998). 
 57. Ronald Angel & Jacqueline Worobey, Single Motherhood and Children’s Health, 29 J. 
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 38 (1988); Olle Lundberg, The Impact of Childhood Living Conditions on 
Illness and Mortality in Adulthood, 36 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1047 (1993). 
 58. Trude Bennett, Marital Status and Infant Health Outcomes, 35(9) SOC. SCI. & MED. 1179 
(1992); Trude Bennett & Paula Braveman, Maternal Marital Status as a Risk Factor for Infant 
Mortality, 26(6) FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 252 (1994); J.A. Gaudino, Jr., et al., No Fathers’ 
Names: A Risk Factor for Infant Mortality in the State of Georgia, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 253 (1999); 
C.D. Siegel, et al., Mortality from Intentional and Unintentional Injury Among Infants of Young 
Mothers in Colorado, 1982 to 1992, 150(10) ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 1077 
(1996). 
 59. See, e.g., SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE 
PARENT: WHAT HELPS, WHAT HURTS (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) (1994); Paul R. 
Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s: An Update of the Amato and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis, 
15(3) J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 355 (2001); Timothy J. Biblarz & Gregg Gottainer, Family Structure and 
Children’s Success: A Comparison of Widowed and Divorced Single-Mother Families, 62(2) J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 533 (2000); Zeng-Yin Cheng & Howard B. Kaplan, Explaining the Impact of 
Family Structure During Adolescence on Adult Educational Attainment, 7(2) APPLIED BEHAV. & 
SCI. REV. 23 (1999); William H. Jeynes, The Effects of Several of the Most Common Family 
Structures on the Academic Achievement of Eighth Graders, 30(1/2) MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 73 
(2000); Dean Lillard & Jennifer Gerner, Getting to the Ivy League, 70(6) J. HIGHER EDUC. 206 
(1996). 
 60. Chris Coughlin & Samuel Vuchinich, Family Experience in Preadolescence and the 
Development of Male Delinquency, 58(2) J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 491 (1996); Ross L. Matsueda & 
Karen Heimer, Race, Family Structure and Delinquency: A Test of Differential Association and 
Social Control Theories, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 171 (1987); George Thomas & Michael P. Farrell, The 
Effects of Single-Mother Families and Nonresident Fathers on Delinquency and Substance Abuse, 
58(4) J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 884 (1996). 
 61. Cynthia Harper & Sara McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration, paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (August 1998). 
 62. E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE 
RECONSIDERED (2002); Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky, Parental Divorce, Life-Course 
Disruption, and Adult Depression, 61(4) J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1034 (1999); Andrew J. Cherlin et 
al., Parental Divorce in Childhood and Demographic Outcomes in Young Adulthood, 32 
DEMOGRAPHY 299 (1995). 
 63. J.E. Schwartz, et al., Childhood Sociodemographic and Psychosocial Factors as 
Predictors of Mortality Across the Life-Span, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1237 (1995); Joan S. Tucker. 
et al., Parental Divorce: Effects on Individual Behavior and Longevity, 73(2) J. PERSONALITY & 
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mothers and fathers.64 Thus, any development that weakens the 
traditional family headed by married, biological parents is likely to 
increase all of these risks to children, and also to the communities in 
which these children live. 
Consider, for example, just one of the increased risks children face 
when mothers and fathers do not get and stay married: criminal and 
delinquent behavior. An impressive number of social science studies 
confirm that individual children are more likely to engage in criminal 
conduct when raised in fatherless households. For example, a 2000 study 
that looked at crime in rural counties in four states concluded, “[A]n 
increase of 13% in female-headed households would produce a doubling 
of the offense rate. . . .”65
A study that analyzed a database following 6,403 males from their 
teens to their early thirties concluded that after controlling for race, 
income and family background, boys who were raised outside of intact 
marriages were two to three times more likely to commit a crime that 
leads to incarceration. The authors concluded: “The results . . . show that, 
controlling for income and all other factors, youths in father-absent 
families (mother only, mother-stepfather, and relatives/other) still had 
significantly higher odds of incarceration than those from other-father 
families66. . . . Youth who never had a father in the household had the 
highest incarceration odds.”67
In addition, recent studies depict important indirect effects of 
increases in fatherless families on children in intact families as well. In a 
large (but non-scientific) sample of 4,671 eighth graders drawn from 
students attending 35 schools in ten cities, researchers found that 
students attending schools with a higher proportion of teens from single-
parent families committed more violent offenses, regardless of their own 
family structure. “An important thing to notice about the results is that it 
matters how many single-parent families a student is exposed to, 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 381 (1997). 
 64. ALAN C. ACOCK & DAVID H. DEMO, FAMILY DIVERSITY AND WELL-BEING (1994); PAUL 
R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK (1997); Nicholas Zill, et al., Long-Term Effects 
of Parental Divorce on Parent-Child Relationships, Adjustment, and Achievement in Young 
Adulthood, 7(1) J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91 (1993); E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR 
BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2002); William S. Aquilino, Impact of 
Childhood Family Disruption on Young Adults’ Relationships with Parents, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
295 (1994). 
 65. D. Wayne Osgood & Jeff M. Chambers, Social Disorganization Outside the Metropolis: 
An Analysis of Rural Youth Violence, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 81, 103 (2000). 
 66. “Other-father families” are families in which the adult male is not the biological father. 
 67. Cynthia C. Harper & Sara S. McLanahan, Father Absence and Youth Incarceration, 
14(3) J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 369, 385-86 (2004). 
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regardless of whether the student has one or two parents in the home.”68
The benefits of marriage for children described by this social science 
literature do not appear to be direct legal incidents of marriage, of the 
kind that the state can therefore transfer at will to other family forms. 
Children living with remarried parents, for example, appear to do no 
better than children with single mothers, on average.69 A review of the 
last decade’s research published in the Journal of Marriage and Family in 
2000 concluded: “[M]ost researchers reported that stepchildren were 
similar to children living with single mothers on the preponderance of 
outcome measures and that stepchildren generally were at greater risk for 
problems than were children living with both of their parents.”70
Existing scientific data thus suggests that the law of marriage 
 68. Amy L. Anderson, Individual and Contextual Influences on Delinquency: The Role of the 
Single-Parent Family, 30 J. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 575, 585 (2002). 
 69. “Research does not generally support the idea that remarriage is better for children than 
living with a single mother.” INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, WILLIAM J. DOHERTY, ET AL., 
WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: 21 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 5 (2002); see also, SARA 
MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HELPS, WHAT 
HURTS (1994) (“In general, compared with children living with both their parents, young people 
from disrupted families are more likely to drop out of high school, and young women from one-
parent families are more likely to become teen mothers, irrespective of the conditions under which 
they began to live with single mothers and irrespective of whether their mothers remarry or 
experience subsequent disruptions.”); Stephen Demuth & Susan L. Brown, Family structure, family 
processes, and adolescent delinquency: the significance of parental absence versus parental gender, 
41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 58, 71 (2004) (“[A]dolescents living in single-mother, single-
father, and stepfamilies report significantly higher delinquency than those in two-biological-parent 
married families. These differences remain significant even after controlling for child and parent 
characteristics.”); Thomas L. Hanson, et al., Double jeopardy: parental conflict and stepfamily 
outcomes for children, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 141, 146 (1996) (“[F]or the most part, children in 
stepfather households and children in single-mother households score similarly on the measures of 
academic performance and psychological adjustment.”); William H. Jeynes, Effects of remarriage 
following divorce on the academic achievement of children, 28 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 385, 390 
(1999) (“These findings do not support the assumption held by many educators that children of 
divorce from reconstituted homes are better off academically than children of divorce from single-
parent homes. Remarriage following divorce does not positively affect academic achievement and 
may actually have a negative effect on academic achievement.”) (emphasis in original); Valerie E. 
Lee, et al., Family Structure and Its Effect on Behavioral and Emotional Problems in Young 
Adolescents, 4 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 405, 429 (1994) (“Another finding we wish to highlight is 
the fact that eighth graders are at least as likely to experience problems as a result of living in 
households occupied by stepfamilies as in single-parent households.”); Wendy D. Manning & 
Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent well-being in cohabiting, married, and single-parent families, 65 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 890 (2003) (“Adolescents in married, two-biological-parent families 
generally fare better than children in any of the family types examined here, including single-mother, 
cohabiting stepfather, and married stepfather families. The advantage of marriage appears to exist 
primarily when the child is the biological offspring of both parents”); Nicholas Zill, et al., Long-term 
Effects of Parental Divorce on Parent-Child Relationships, Adjustment, and Achievement in Young 
Adulthood. 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 99 (1993) (“[T]here is no clear evidence that remarriage has a 
protective or ameliorative effect against the negative consequences of family discord and 
disruption”). 
 70. Marilyn Coleman, et al., Reinvestigating Remarriage: Another Decade of Progress, 62 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1288, 1292 (2000). 
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protects children to the extent it increases the likelihood that children 
will be born to and raised by their own mother and father in a reasonably 
harmonious union. By the same token, the data suggest that anything that 
weakens the institution of man/woman marriage, or that indirectly 
encourages people to have children outside of such unions (e.g. by 
suggesting that mother/father homes have no special importance for 
children because what counts is only love and not family structure), will 
place many children at risk. 
Meanwhile, relatively little is known from a scientific standpoint 
about how children fare raised by same-sex couples from birth, 
compared to other family structures. For example, after reviewing 
several hundred studies for the Attorney General of Canada, University 
of Virginia sociologist Steve Nock concluded: 
 
Through this analysis I draw my conclusions that 1) all of the articles I 
reviewed contained at least one fatal flaw of design or execution; and 
2) not a single one of those studies was conducted according to 
generally accepted standards of scientific research.71
Other scholars have noted similar concerns.72 A recent review of 
social science evidence on same-sex parenting appeared in the Fall 2005 
issue of The Future of Children, a peer-reviewed journal published 
jointly by Princeton University and the Brookings Institution. The two 
gay scholars, both proponents of same-sex marriage, note that because of 
limitations in this body of research, “What the evidence does not 
provide, because of the methodological difficulties we outlined, is much 
knowledge about whether those studied are typical or atypical of the 
general population of children raised by gay and lesbian couples. We do 
not know how the normative child in a same-sex family compares with 
other children.”73
As the Goodridge dissent points out: 
 
 71. Nock Aff. ¶ 3, Halpern v. Attorney General of Canada, Case No. 684/00 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 
of Justice), available at http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/Law/cases/Canada/ontario/halpern/aff_nock.pdf 
(last visited December 6, 2005). 
 72. See, e.g., Diana Baumrind, Commentary on Sexual Orientation: Research and Social 
Policy Implications, 31(1) DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 130 (1995). Another review, prepared by 
Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai in 2001, looked at forty-nine separate parenting studies before 
concluding that “the methods used in these studies are so flawed that the studies prove nothing.” 
Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, No Basis: What the Studies Don’t Tell Us About Same-Sex 
Parenting 6 (2001). 
 73. William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting and America’s 
Children, 15(2) FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 104 (Fall 2005). 
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[A]ttempts at scientific study of the ramifications of 
raising children in same-sex couple households are 
themselves in their infancy and have so far produced 
inconclusive and conflicting results. . . . Our belief that 
children raised by same-sex couples should fare the same 
as children raised in traditional families is just that: a 
passionately held but utterly untested belief. The 
Legislature is not required to share that belief but 
may . . . wish to see the proof before making a 
fundamental alteration to that institution.74
Moreover, despite the weakening of our marriage culture that has 
occurred in the forty years since the “free love” and no-fault divorce 
movements of the 1960s, the old view of marriage as a loving sexual 
union that has as a core purpose encouraging men and women to make 
and rear the next generation together, continues to hold. A 2005 
nationally representative poll of American marriage attitudes, supervised 
by University of Texas sociologist Norval T. Glenn, asked Americans 
whether the most important good of marriage was “the happiness and 
well-being of the married individuals” or “children who are well-
adjusted and who will become good citizens.” Only 13 percent of 
Americans said the happiness of adults was the most important purpose 
of marriage; 74 percent insisted that both are equally important.75
Admittedly, there is not a perfect correlation between monogamous, 
heterosexual marriage and procreation; some heterosexual couples marry 
beyond the child-bearing years, and others choose not to have children at 
all. But for the vast majority of heterosexual marriages, procreation 
remains not only a distinct possibility but an express purpose of 
marriage,76 and the institution is designed to encourage that children are 
 74. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 979-80 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman, J., 
dissenting). 
 75. Norval T. Glenn, With this Ring: A National Survey on Marriage in America 30 (National 
Fatherhood Initiative: Gaithersburg, MD) (2005). 
 76. The Sacrament of Marriage in the Catholic Church, for example, “is a covenant by which 
a man and a woman establish in the presence of God and His Church a lifetime partnership, which 
by nature is ordered for the good of the spouses and the procreation of children.” “MARRIAGE,” 
GLOSSARY, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 887 (2d ed., 2000) (emphasis added); See also 
CODE OF CANON LAW, Cod. iur. can., c. 1013 & 7 (“The primary end of marriage is the procreation 
and the education of children”); THE BAPTIST CONFESSION OF FAITH OF 1689, Ch. 25, ¶ 2 
(“Marriage was ordained for the mutual help of husband and wife, for the increase of mankind with a 
legitimate issue, and the preventing of uncleanliness”) (citing Gen. 1:28, emphasis added) (available 
at http://www.1689.com/Confession/confession.html#Ch.%2025); “HUMAN SEXUALITY: A 
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE,” A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY AND CHURCH 
RELATIONS OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, at 7 (“In marriage God intends to 
provide for (1) the relation of man and woman in mutual love (Gen. 2:18); (2) the procreation of 
children (Gen. 1:28); and (3) the partial remedy for sinful lust (1 Cor. 7:2)”) (available at 
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not just conceived, but reared—by both biological mother and biological 
father, the individuals with the strongest natural bond to the children. 
Moreover, even marital unions of husband and wife that do not produce 
children further the state’s interest in procreation and paternity, because 
they reduce the possibility of alternative sexual unions that may produce 
out-of-wedlock births. Only by first committing to an exclusive, faithful, 
enduring sexual, financial and emotional union can men and women 
attracted to the opposite sex ensure that any children they conceive will 
be protected by and connected to both their mother and father. As the 
Indiana Court of Appeals recently noted: 
 
One of the State’s key interests in supporting opposite-sex marriage is 
not necessarily to encourage and promote “natural” procreation across 
the board and at the expense of other forms of becoming parents, such 
as by adoption and assisted reproduction; rather, it encourages 
opposite-sex couples who, by definition, are the only type of couples 
that can reproduce on their own by engaging in sex with little or no 
contemplation of the consequences that might result, i.e. a child, to 
procreate responsibly.77
The same circumstance simply does not exist with same-sex 
marriage. Even where the same-sex couple chooses to raise children, at 
least one, and frequently both, of the partners have no biological 
connection to the children. The decision to have children, then, becomes 
entirely separate from the decision to marry and/or engage in sexual 
relations, and the more widespread that notion becomes, the more 
difficult will it be to sustain the procreative and paternal aspects of 
marriage. 
Maggie Gallagher, the President of the Institute for Marriage and 
Public Policy, has described the problem as follows: 
 
Same-sex marriage in Massachusetts is not merely about opening a new 
set of legal benefits to more individuals . . . . The meaning of marriage 
itself must change . . . . The procreative potential of sexual unions must 
be reduced from the great, brute, obvious, important fact it has been 
through most of human history, to a minor, not very significant feature 
of human relationships, largely unrelated to any key purpose of 
marriage. In the process, the idea that mothers and fathers are the norm 
for children must also go.78
http://www.lcms.org/graphics/assets/media/CTCR/Human_Sexuality1.pdf). 
 77. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. App. 2005). 
 78. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A 
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Brigham Young University Law Professor Lynn Wardle has elaborated 
on the point, describing the potential consequences of severing the link 
between marriage and procreation: 
 
Legalizing same-sex marriage would weaken the nexus between 
procreation and parenting. The already ambiguous role and meaning of 
parenthood would be made even more ambiguous. . . . The further 
separation of procreation from marriage implicit in legalization of 
same-sex marriage would send a cultural message of parental 
disconnection from family duties that could further diminish the level 
of responsibility of absent parents.79
These observations are confirmed even by many proponents of 
same-sex marriage, who argue that there is not now any significant 
connection between marriage and procreation and/or family structure 
(fathers and mothers).80 For example, same-sex marriage activist E.J. 
Graff argues that “[i]f same-sex marriage becomes legal, that venerable 
institution will ever after stand for sexual choice, for cutting the link 
between sex and diapers.”81 According to Professor William Eskridge, 
the link between marriage and procreation has already been severed: 
“[I]n today’s society the importance of marriage is relational not 
procreational.”82 Andrew Sullivan makes a similar argument, suggesting 
that “[f]rom being a means to bringing up children, [marriage] has 
become primarily a way in which two adults affirm their emotional 
commitment to one another.”83 And in the pending challenge to 
California’s marriage laws, the City of San Francisco itself argues that 
procreation is not an “essential or even important purpose for 
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 59-60 (2004). 
 79. Lynn D. Wardle, Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of 
State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUBL. POL’Y 771, 798 (2001). 
 80. As Professor Doug Kmiec notes, some advocates of same-sex marriage contend that there 
never has been any link between marriage and procreation, or that such a link no longer exists today. 
Criticizing such claims, Kmiec writes: “In truth, the advocates of same-sex marriage cannot 
genuinely mean that procreation has not been, in fact, linked with marriage. Rather, what same-sex 
partisans actually mean is that they would prefer procreation not to be associated with the marital 
estate . . . . Sexual reproduction for the human species is not merely one of several equally attractive 
ways to bring forth a child, it is the assumed way. It is no coincidence that those with religious 
beliefs that correspond most strongly with a traditional understanding of marriage as linked to 
procreation do, indeed, have the most children.” Douglas W. Kmiec, The Procreative Argument for 
Proscribing Same-Sex Marriage, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 653, 660 (2004). 
 81. E.J. Graff, Retying the Knot, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER, 134, 
135-36 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1st ed., Vintage Books 1997). 
 82. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 11 (1996). 
 83. Andrew Sullivan, Introduction, to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER, at 
xix, n. 82 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997). 
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marriage.”84
Judith Stacey, sociology professor at New York University, 
approvingly suggests that redefining marriage to include same-sex 
unions may help to supplant the marital family with a new ethic of 
family diversity: 
 
Legitimizing gay and lesbian marriages would promote a democratic, 
pluralist expansion of the meaning, practice, and politics of family life 
in the United States, helping to supplant the destructive sanctity of The 
Family with respect for diverse and vibrant families. . . . If we begin to 
value the meaning and quality of intimate bonds over their customary 
forms, people might devise marriage and kinship patterns to serve 
diverse needs. . . . Two friends might decide to “marry” without basing 
their bond on erotic or romantic attachment. . . . Or, more radical still, 
perhaps some might dare to question the dyadic limitations of Western 
marriage and seek some of the benefits of extended family life through 
small group marriages arranged to share resources, nurturance, and 
labor. After all, if it is true that “The Two-Parent Family is Better” than 
a single-parent family, as family-values crusaders proclaim, might not 
three-, four-, or more-parent families be better yet, as many utopian 
communards have long believed?85
A New Jersey Appellate court expressed the same insight, if in less 
celebratory terms: 
 
The same form of constitutional attack that plaintiffs mount against 
statutes limiting the institution of marriage to members of the opposite 
sex also could be made against statutes prohibiting polygamy. Persons 
who desire to enter into polygamous marriages undoubtedly view such 
marriages, just as plaintiffs view same-sex marriages, as “compelling 
and definitive expressions of love and commitment” among the parties 
to the union. Indeed, there is arguably a stronger foundation for 
challenging statutes prohibiting polygamy than statutes limiting 
marriage to members of the opposite sex “because, unlike gay 
marriage, [polygamy] has been and still is condoned by many religions 
and societies.”86
These kinds of consequences will not happen all at once, if they 
 84. San Francisco’s Opp. To Motions for Summary Judgment, Dec. 3, 2004, at 32, City and 
County of San Francisco et al. v. State of California, No. CGC-04-429539 (S.F. Super. Ct.). 
 85. JUDITH STACEY, GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES: QUEER LIKE US, IN ALL OUR FAMILIES: 
NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 117, 128-29 (Mary Ann Mason, Arlene Skolnick & Stephen D. 
Sugarman eds., Oxford U. Press 1998). 
 86. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 270 (N.J. App. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
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happen at all. They will affect behavior by gradually displacing an older 
understanding of marriage with the new unisex model of interpersonal 
commitment, only dimly if at all related to children or family structure. 
To the extent the court establishes same-sex marriage as a civil right, 
older conjugal views of marriage will be branded as discriminatory, and 
(like racism) be subjected to social disapproval and indirect legal 
pressure. Under these circumstances, fewer people – perhaps very few 
indeed – in the public square will be willing to say that marriage is about 
procreation and paternity, or that marriage matters because children need 
mothers and fathers. 
If, as seems likely, same-sex marriage interferes at all with the 
capacity of marriage to channel the procreative energies of men and 
women towards exclusive permanent sexual unions called “marriage,” 
the result will be real harm to potentially millions of children. If it 
interferes greatly, our society as a whole may well be put at risk. 
 
V. HAS THE JUDICIARY USURPED A ROLE IN THIS POLICY DEBATE? 
 
But the most troubling aspect of this massive shift in public policy is 
that it has occurred almost entirely outside the deliberative political 
process. Most of the efforts to redefine marriage are not coming through 
state legislatures but rather are being imposed by courts, and even when 
elected legislatures do become involved, it is often the result of court 
orders that have already largely determined the outcome of the 
legislature’s policy deliberations, with only the barest of pretext in 
constitutional text.  In Massachusetts, for example, the Supreme Judicial 
Court in the Goodridge case found a right to same-sex marriage in a 
Constitution that has been unchanged since 1780 when it was first 
penned by John Adams, and no one has dared to suggest that John 
Adams had same-sex marriage in mind when he penned those phrases, or 
that such was in the minds of those who ratified that constitution.  The 
California courts seem poised to take the same step, in response to San 
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsome’s unilateral decision to hand out 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, altering a century and a half of 
California marriage law and ignoring a recent, overwhelmingly-approved 
state-wide voter initiative in the process. 
Perhaps it is a necessary outgrowth of the shift from a societal 
benefit model to an individual autonomy/rights model of marriage 
described above, but these judicial decrees are not only overturning the 
long-standing policy judgments of the people, they are pre-empting any 
deliberation about the potential societal consequences of this massive 
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social experiment.  This was not the role our nation’s founders 
envisioned for the Courts, but our interest here is more than simply 
constitutional purity.  Thomas Jefferson captured the concern perfectly in 
a letter he wrote to William Charles Jarvies toward the end of his life: 
“You seem to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all 
constitutional questions, a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one 
which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy.”87  Abraham 
Lincoln, criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,88 made the identical point in his First Inaugural Address: 
 
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government, 
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably 
fixed by decision of the Supreme Court, . . . the people will have 
ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically 
resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.89
Whether one agrees with Goodridge and Lawrence or not, surely it is 
evident that a judiciary powerful enough to impose such rules is also 
powerful enough to impose the opposite rules whenever it strikes their 
fancy.  The despotic nature of the action itself, rather than the particular 
action taken in any given instance, should give us all pause for concern.  
The question is what ordinary citizens can do to address such arrogations 
of power. 
At the federal level, our Constitution actually envisions several 
checks on the judicial power, just as it envisions several checks on the 
powers of each of the other branches of government; the notion that the 
judiciary is to be entirely independent of the political branches is a 
relatively modern invention, and it is not only erroneous but dangerous.  
The checks on the judiciary actually found in the Constitution run the 
gambit from control over the nomination of “Judges of the Supreme 
Court,” which is vested exclusively in the President,90 and control over 
the actual appoint of judges, which is shared by the President and the 
Senate,91 to Congress’s ability to define the scope of the jurisdiction and 
 87. Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvies, Sept. 28, 1820, available at http://memory. 
loc.gov/master/mss/mtj/mtj1/052/0200/0275.jpg (last visited April 2, 2006). 
 88. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 89. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953), quoted in Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some 
Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 685 (1995). 
 90. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 91. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  Congress may vest the appointment of “inferior officers” 
“in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments,” and it remains an 
open question whether lower court judges, who serve on “inferior Courts,” see Art. III, § 1, qualify 
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even the very existence of the lower courts92 and also the scope of the 
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,”93 to Congress’s power over 
appropriations,94 and ultimately to Congress’s power of impeachment.95  
Yet most have proved to be utterly ineffective. 
Quite frankly, it is becoming more and more clear that the full range 
of these constitutional checks on the federal judiciary needs to be revived 
as viable options—up to and even including the impeachment of judges 
who, despite acknowledging that the Constitution does not address a 
certain matter, will nevertheless invalidate acts of the elected legislature 
by judicial fiat.  Without such checks on the judiciary—and to the list of 
constitutional provisions cited above we should add non-enforcement by 
the Executive, a check suggested by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 
for courts that exercise “Force” or “Will” instead of “merely judgment—
we are in danger of proving the predictions made by Jefferson and 
Lincoln. 
Similar horizontal checks exist on the judiciaries of the several 
states, by virtue of various separation-of-powers provisions in their 
respective state constitutions.  The Judiciary Committee of the Colorado 
House of Representatives, for example, recently held a hearing to 
consider Articles of Impeachment against a Colorado state court judge 
who had ignored Colorado’s prohibition on same-sex adoption and 
ordered that a custodial parent be required to share custody of her child 
with a former lesbian partner.96
The state courts also have vertical checks on them, most frequently 
exhibited by virtue of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over 
them.97  State court judges are bound to support the federal Constitution 
as “inferior officers” for purposes of this alternate appointment mechanism. 
 92. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested . . . in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”). 
 93. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction . . . 
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make”); Ex Parte McCardle, 
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 94. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law”). 
 95. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power 
of Impeachment”); Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments”); Art. II, § 4 (“[A]ll civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office 
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors”); Art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior”). 
 96. Colo. H.R. 04-1007, Concerning the Impeachment of Judge John W. Coughlin; 
Impeachment Hearing Before Colorado House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee (April 22, 
2004); see also In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2004) (affirming in part, vacating in part, 
and remanding to trial courts). 
 97. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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as well,98 and Article IV, section 4 of that Constitution provides that 
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a 
Republican Form of Government,” which, at its core, requires that major 
policy judgments be made with the consent of the people rather than 
imposed on them by an unaccountable judiciary. 
Although claims premised on the Republican Guaranty Clause have 
long been viewed as nonjusticiable political questions in most 
circumstances,99 Justice O’Connor noted in New York v. United States 
“that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present 
nonjusticiable political questions.”100 “Contemporary commentators,” 
she noted, “have likewise suggested that courts should address the merits 
of such claims, at least in some circumstances.101  Several lower courts 
have, post-New York, acknowledged that the Republican Guarantee 
Clause might present justiciable questions, but thus far all have found 
that the Clause had not been violated in the particular circumstances at 
issue in the cases.102  For these courts, the essence of the republican 
guaranty is the right of a State’s citizens to “structure their government 
as they see fit,”103 and in New York itself, the Supreme Court dismissed 
the Guarantee Clause claim only because the statute in that case did not 
“pose any realistic risk of altering the form or the method of functioning 
of New York’s government.”104  When courts take it upon themselves to 
decide major social policy issues without express textual support in the 
state or federal constitutions, the basic separation-of-powers structure of 
those constitutions is violated. 
There is a final check on both federal and statute judiciaries that 
should be addressed, namely, the right of the people to amend the 
Constitution,105 essentially removing from the courts any claimed 
 98. U.S. Const. Art. 6, cl. 3. 
 99. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46-47 (1849). 
 100. 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1992). 
 101. Id. at 185 (citing L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 398 (2d ed. 1988)); J. Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 118, and n., 122-23 (1980); W. Wiecek, The 
Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution 287-89, 300 (1972); D. Merritt, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70-
78 (Jan. 1988); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional 
Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560-65 (1962)). 
 102. See Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997); Adams v. Clinton, 90 
F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2000); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 468-69 (3rd Cir. 1996); 
Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 27-28 (2nd Cir. 1996); Deer Park Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Harris Cty. 
Appraisal Dist., 132 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (5th Cir. 1998); City of New York v. United States, 179 
F.3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1999); Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1511 (10th Cir. 1995). But see State 
ex. rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145 (Or. 1997) (holding that such claims remain 
nonjusticiable). 
 103. Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1511. 
 104. 505 U.S. at 186. 
 105. U.S. Const. Art. V; See also Declaration of Independence ¶ 2 (1776). 
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authority over the subject.  The proposed Federal Marriage Protection 
Amendment currently pending before Congress is just such an effort.  
The first provision of the proposed amendment, aimed at the federal 
courts, would preempt any Supreme Court decision that would judicially 
impose same-sex “marriage” on the entire country, mandating that 
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of union of a man and a 
woman.”  But as we learned in Goodridge and elsewhere, there are a 
number of state courts that have done or will soon do the same thing, so a 
second provision of the FMPA would bar activist state courts from 
judicially imposing same-sex marriage at the state level.  “Neither this 
Constitution [the federal], nor the constitution of any state shall be 
construed”—that’s not a bar on legislative action, for it is courts that 
“construe” constitutional provisions—”to require that marriage or the 
legal incidence thereof be conferred upon any other union than the union 
of a man and a woman.” 
Despite protestations to the contrary, the FMPA currently under 
consideration in Congress would not bar state legislators from 
authorizing civil unions and otherwise conferring on same-sex couples 
some of the benefits of marriage.  But such judgments would, under the 
FMPA, have to be made by the elected branches of government as a 
matter of social policy, judgments that would be well within the exercise 
of the state’s police power—the power to regulate the health, safety, 
welfare, and morals of the people. 
In other words, the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment is both 
pro-federalism and pro-separation of powers.  It would prevent courts 
from imposing a national rule on the states, and it would prevent state 
courts from imposing their will against the will of the people of their 
state.  There would be a restoration of the people’s primary role in 
determining fundamental questions of social policy that can have, and in 
the past (in such matters as no-fault divorce) have had massive social 
consequences.  These are questions of social policy and they ought to be 
deliberated by the body politic rather than imposed by unelected judges.  
Otherwise, we should all fear that Lincoln’s prediction has come true—
that if policy decisions affecting the whole people are to be “irrevocably 
fixed” by judicial decision, “the people will have ceased, to be their own 
rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into 
the hands of that eminent tribunal.”106
 
 
 106. Abraham Lincoln, supra note 89. 
